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Recently the concept of quantum information
has been introduced into game theory. Here we
present the first study of quantum games with
more than two players. We discover that such
games can possess a new form of equilibrium
strategy, one which has no analogue either in
traditional games or even in two-player quantum
games. In these ‘pure’ coherent equilibria, entan-
glement shared among multiple players enables
new kinds of cooperative behavior: indeed it can
act as a contract, in the sense that it prevents
players from successfully betraying one-another.
Game theory is a mature field of applied mathematics.
It formalizes the conflict between competing agents, and
has found applications ranging from economics through
to biology [1,2]. Quantum information is a young field of
physics. At its heart is the realization that information is
ultimately a physical quantity, rather than a mathemat-
ical abstraction [3]. It is known that various problems
in this field can be usefully thought of as games. Quan-
tum cryptography, for example, is readily cast as a game
between the individuals who wish to communicate, and
those who wish to eavesdrop [4]. Quantum cloning has
been thought of as a physicist playing a game against
nature [5], and indeed even the measurement process it-
self may be thought of in these terms [6]. Furthermore,
Meyer [7,8] has pointed out that the algorithms conceived
for quantum computers may be usefully thought of as
games between classical and quantum agents. Against
this background, it is natural to seek a unified theory
of games and quantum mechanics [9–11]. Such a theory
might lend insight into biological and chemical processes
occurring in the quantum regime; it would certainly pro-
vide a fuller understanding of the physics of information
[3].
The fundamental unit of classical information is the
bit. The corresponding unit of quantum information is
the ‘qubit’ – a general quantum superposition of ‘0’ and
‘1’, α0|0〉+ α1|1〉. In multi-qubit systems, superposition
gives rise to entanglement: qubits are entangled if their
states cannot be defined independently from one another.
Whereas a pair of classical bits must be in one of the four
states {00, 01, 10, 11}, a pair of qubits can be in a state,
such as 1√
2
(|0〉⊗|0〉+|1〉⊗|1〉), which cannot be factorized
into two separate qubit states. The interdependence re-
mains even when the two qubits are far apart - this is the
origin of ‘non-local’ effects in quantum mechanics. Al-
though the effect cannot directly transfer information, it
has been identified as a crucial resource in quantum com-
munication, quantum computation and error-correction,
and some forms of quantum cryptography [3]. Here we
will see that when the resources controlled by competing
agents are entangled, they can cooperate to perfectly ex-
ploit their environment (i.e. the ‘game’), and to prevent
one-another from ‘defecting’.
Formally a game involves of a number of agents or
players, who are allowed a certain set of moves or ac-
tions. The payoff function $() specifies how the players
will be rewarded after they have performed their actions.
The ith player’s strategy, si, is her procedure for deciding
which action to play, depending on her information. The
strategy space, S = {si}, is the set of strategies available
to her. A strategy profile s = (s1, s2, .., sN) is an assign-
ment of one strategy to each player. We will use the
term equilibrium purely in its game theoretic sense, i.e.
to refer to a strategy profile with a degree of stability –
for example, in a Nash equilibrium no player can improve
her expected payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy.
The study of equilibria is fundamental in game theory [1].
The games we consider here are static: they are played
only once so that there is no history for the players to
consider. Moreover, each player has complete knowledge
of the game’s structure. Thus the set of allowed actions
corresponds directly to the space of deterministic strate-
gies.
Our procedure for quantizing games is a generalization
of the elegant scheme introduced by Eisert et al. [12,13].
We reason as follows. Game theory, being a branch of
applied mathematics, defines games without reference to
the physical universe. However, quantum mechanics is a
physical theory, and must be applied to a physical sys-
tem. We therefore begin by creating a physical model for
the games of interest. A very natural way to do this is
by considering the flow of information, see Fig 1(a).
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FIG. 1. (a) a physical model for a game in which each
player has two possible actions: we send each player a clas-
sical 2-state system (a bit) in the zero state. They locally
manipulate their bit in whatever way they wish: under clas-
sical physics their choices are really just to flip, or not to
flip. They then return the bits for measurement, from which
the payoff is determined. (b) Our N-player quantized game.
Throughout this paper, ‘measurement’ means measurement
in the computational basis, {|0〉, |1〉}. (c) The effect of intro-
ducing total decoherence of the quantum information. RND
denotes a random classical bit, the vertical lines denote CON-
TROL-NOT.
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This classical physical model is then to be quantized.
Our quantization procedure is the most natural one that
meets the following requirements: (a) The classical infor-
mation carriers (bits) are to be generalized to quantum
systems (qubits). (b) These qubits are to be mutually
entangled [14]. (c) The resulting game must be a gen-
eralization of the classical game: the identity operator Iˆ
should correspond to ‘don’t flip’, and the bit-flipping op-
erator Fˆ = σˆx should correspond to ‘flip’ [15], in the sense
that when all the players restrict themselves to choosing
from {Fˆ , Iˆ}, then the payoffs of the classical game are
recovered. To simultaneously meet requirements (b) and
(c), we employ a pair of entangling gates as shown in
Fig 1(b), and insist that Jˆ commutes with any operator
formed from Fˆ and Iˆ acting in the subspaces of differ-
ent qubits. If we restrict ourselves to unitary, maximally
entangling gates [16] that act symmetrically on ones and
zeros, then we may specify Jˆ without loss of generality
[17]: Jˆ = 1√
2
(Iˆ⊗N + iFˆ⊗N).
The representation in Fig. 1 (b) allows one to regard
quantized games as simple quantum algorithms. The
games we consider below could in fact be realized in a
quantum computer possessing very few qubits (between
one and three qubits per player, depending on the gen-
erality of the strategy space) [21]. NMR quantum com-
puters already have sufficient qubits for this purpose.
In comparing the quantum and classical games, the
choice of strategy space is fundamental. The classical
game is to be embedded in the quantum game, therefore
the space should include playing the ‘classical’ actions
{Iˆ,Fˆ}, but in principle we could choose any superset
of this ‘classical’ space. Previous studies have consid-
ered two-player games, and have employed strategy sets
of limited generality. For example, in Ref [8] Meyer ex-
plored the consequences of giving one player a full unitary
strategy space whilst constraining the other to use only
the ‘classical’ space – as one might expect, the quantum
player dominates the game. Meyer has provided [7] an in-
teresting interpretation of such one-sided games wherein
the players are a quantum computer and its operator. In
a second approach [13], Eisert et al permitted both play-
ers the same strategy set, but introduced an arbitrary
constraint into that set [18]. This amounts to permitting
a certain strategy Q whilst forbidding the logical counter
strategy – as one might intuitively expect, Q emerges
as the ideal strategy. In contrast to these earlier ap-
proaches, throughout the present paper we allow all of
our players to perform any action on their qubits which
is quantum mechanically possible. This includes adjoin-
ing arbitrarily large ancillas, performing measurements
and applying operations conditioned on the outcomes of
those measurements. We believe this to be the most nat-
ural generalization of our classical model, where the only
restrictions on the actions of the players were those im-
posed by classical physics. General quantum operations
are represented by trace-preserving, completely-positive
maps, and we denote the space of strategies correspond-
ing to all such operations by STCP .
In traditional game theory, there is a fundamen-
tal distinction between so-called ‘pure’ strategies, in
which players choose their actions deterministically, and
‘mixed’ strategies which can involve probabilistic choices.
An important consequence of adopting a general quan-
tum model is that the players can implement any proba-
bilistic strategy entirely deterministically through the use
of ancillary qubits. For example, such qubits could func-
tion as a random number generator controlling the oper-
ations applied to the primary qubit. Thus, all quantum
strategies could be argued to be ‘deterministic’. Even so,
there is a subset of STCP that is in many ways analo-
gous to the classical deterministic strategies, namely the
set of all strategies which correspond directly to a uni-
tary action. Strategies from this subset, which we label
SU , imply coherent manipulations of the local qubits, i.e.
manipulations without the addition of ancillary qubits.
Another way of identifying the set SU is that they are
precisely the strategies that do not destroy any of the
entanglement introduced by the Jˆ gate [19].
In the multi-player games below, we discover that equi-
libria for all of STCP can consist of strategies drawn only
from SU . We will refer to these special equilibria as pure,
or coherent. They are fundamentally quantum mechan-
ical, in that they disappear when the quantum correla-
tions implicit in the entangled states are replaced with
classical correlations, as in Fig. 1(c). In analogous two-
player games (where both players are permitted STCP ) it
is impossible for ‘pure’ equilibria [18] to occur – instead
equilibria exist only when the players choose to degrade
the entanglement. Unsurprisingly therefore, those equi-
libria do persist in the Fig 1(c) variant.
Consider the classical N -player Minority Game [20].
Here each player privately chooses between two options,
say ‘0’ and ‘1’. The choices are then compared and the
player(s) who have made the minority decision are re-
warded (by one point, say). If there is an even split,
or if all players have made the same choice, then there
is no reward. The structure of this game reflects many
common social dilemmas, for example choosing a route
in rush hour, choosing which evening to visit an over-
crowded bar, or trading in a financial market. We can
immediately quantize this game as discussed above and
shown in Fig. 1.
We begin with N = 3. Does quantization introduce
new equilibria? Yes: for example, the players can co-
ordinate their actions simply by measuring their qubits
and exploiting the classical correlations [21]. However,
such strategies are of limited interest in the present
context, since they also function in the decoherent cir-
cuit of Fig 1(c). In fact, we can quickly prove that
there are no novel ‘pure’ strategies in this game: The
most general pure strategy for player i can be written
si = α
A
i (β
A
i iσx + β
B
i iσy) + α
B
i (γ
A
i I + γ
B
i iσz), where all
the α,β and γ coefficients are real and (αAi )
2 + (αBi )
2 =
(βAi )
2 + (βBi )
2 = (γAi )
2 + (γBi )
2 = 1. Then simply by
applying the J gates and deriving measurement proba-
2
bilities in the standard fashion, we find that the β and γ
terms disappear, yielding
PROB(player 1 in minority)= (αB
1
αA
2
αA
3
)2+(αA
1
αB
2
αB
3
)2,
and similarly for players 2 and 3. But these are just
the probabilities that occur in the classical game, when
we identify the probability of player i choosing to flip
as (αAi )
2. Thus the extra parameters in the quantum
strategies are of no significance, and the quantum game
simply reduces to the classical variant.
Surprisingly, the situation is completely different in
the 4-player Minority Game. Classically, the players
have no better strategy than to choose randomly be-
tween the ‘0’ and ‘1’ actions. The expected payoff for
each player is then one eighth of a point, i.e. the game
only ‘pays out’ half the time. But when we quantize the
game, for the first time we discover fully coherent equi-
libria. One example [22] is the profile s = (a, a, a, a)
where a = 1√
2
cos( pi
16
)(I + iσx) +
1√
2
sin( pi
16
)(iσy − iσz).
With these choices, the final state prior to measurement
is 2−
2
2 (|1000〉+|0100〉+|0010〉+|0001〉−|1110〉−|1101〉−
|1011〉 − |0111〉), i.e. an equal superposition of eight
states, two optimal for each player. Thus each player has
expected payoff 1
4
– twice the performance of the clas-
sical game and the logical maximum for a cooperative
solution. The reasoning below proves that the profile s is
a true Nash equilibrium: even though the players are al-
lowed the full generality of STCP , no player can improve
her expected payoff by unilaterally defecting from s.
1. Note that the Minority Game has the special prop-
erty that the same expected payoffs result whether
or not we apply the second gate, Jˆ†, prior to
measurement. This can be seen by noting that
Jˆ† transforms any basis vector |abcd〉 only within
the sub-space spanned by {|abcd〉, |a¯b¯c¯d¯〉}, where
x¯ = NOT (x). Since both |abcd〉 and |a¯b¯c¯d¯〉 have
the same payoff value, the expected payoff is left
invariant by the Jˆ†.
2. Because of (1), we can focus attention on the state
prior to Jˆ†. This state has the property that mea-
surement of any three of the four qubits will yield
one of the eight outcomes, (000), (001), ...,(111),
with equal probability. This must remain true re-
gardless of what local action was performed on the
fourth qubit. Violation of this physical principle
would mean that entanglement could be used for
faster than light information transfer, for example.
3. Six of these eight outcomes are unwinnable by the
fourth player: if, for example, measurement of the
first three qubits yields (001), then neither a ‘0’ or a
‘1’ will put the fourth player in the minority. Thus,
because of the equal weighting of the outcomes, her
expected payoff cannot exceed 1
4
. But this is just
the payoff each player has with the originally pro-
posed strategy profile.
Thus in moving from the N = 3 to the N = 4
player Minority game, a fundamentally new, non-classical
equilibrium becomes available. This equilibrium is opti-
mal and fair: the game always pays out the maximum
amount and the expected payoff for each of the players
is the same. In the classical Minority Game, this can be
achieved, but only by sharing additional classical infor-
mation [23]. We are therefore led to ask, are there games
with pure quantum equilibria whose performance cannot
be matched classically even in the presence of free com-
munication? Surprisingly, the answer is yes. To demon-
strate, we exploit the concept of ‘dominant’ strategies.
A player has a dominant strategy if this strategy yields
a higher payoff than any alternative, regardless of the
strategies adopted by other players. A rational player
will inevitably adopt such a strategy – even when we
allow free conversation with other players (unless we in-
troduce some kind of binding contract, which amounts to
switching to another payoff table entirely). Most games,
including the Minority Game considered earlier, do not
possess dominant strategies. If every player has a domi-
nant strategy, then the game’s inevitable outcome is the
dominant-strategy equilibrium. The famous Prisoner’s
Dilemma, shown in Fig 2(a), has the dominant-strategy
equilibrium (‘defect’,‘defect’). As noted above, no maxi-
mally entangled two-player quantum game can have equi-
libria in the strategy space SU . Thus, quantization of
Prisoner’s Dilemma removes the dominant-strategy equi-
librium [12], but does not provide alternative coherent
equilibria that might offer better payoffs to the players.
(-9,-9,-9)
(-9,-9, 8)
(-9, 8,-9)
( 8,-9,-9)
(-9, 1, 1)
( 1, 1,-9)
( 1,-9, 1)
( 7, 7, 7)
Payoff to
Players
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 1
( 0, 0, 0)
(-9,-9, 1)
(-9, 1,-9)
( 1,-9,-9)
( 1, 9, 9)
( 9, 9, 1)
( 9, 1, 9)
( 2, 2, 2)
Measured
State
Payoff to
Players
(a) (b)
0 0
0 1
1 0
1 1
( 3, 3 )
( 0, 5 )
( 5, 0 )
( 1, 1 )
Measured
State
Payoff to
Players
0=’Cooperate’
1=’Defect’
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FIG. 2. Games possessing a dominant-strategy equilib-
rium: (a) table defining the payoffs in Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Either player reasons thus: ‘If my partner were to cooper-
ate, my best action would be to defect. If he were to defect,
my best action is still to defect. Thus I have a dominant
strategy: “always defect.” ’ (b) Table defining the payoffs
for a three-player game. Classically, each player has the dom-
inant strategy ‘choose 1’. Consequently, each player’s payoff is
just 2 points (despite the existence of strategy profiles, such
as ‘choose 1 with probability 80%’, for which all the play-
ers have greater expected payoffs). However in the quantum
game, radically superior new coherent equilibria arise. (c) A
game where quantum players do less well than their classical
counterparts.
To investigate the multi-player case, we quantize the
game of Figure 2(b). We find that coherent equilibria do
3
occur. The classically inevitable outcome, now written as
(Fˆ , Fˆ , Fˆ ), becomes a Nash equilibrium – but other, radi-
cally superior equilibria emerge. For example, the profile
s = (Iˆ , 1√
2
(σˆx + σˆz), σˆx), with expected payoffs (5, 9, 5),
is a Nash equilibrium (and is strict for players A and C:
any unilateral deviation necessarily leads to reduction in
their expected payoffs). Note that there is no in-principle
difficultly with the asymmetry [24] of the profile, since in
this game we are allowing free classical communication
between players. The proof that this profile is a Nash
equilibrium runs as follows.
Let |ψ〉 = (Iˆ ⊗ i√
2
(σˆx + σˆz) ⊗ Iˆ)Jˆ |000〉 be the state
after the actions of players A and B, and suppose that
player C applies a general open quantum operation R,
i.e. a completely positive, trace-preserving map on den-
sity operators. By the Kraus representation theorem [25],
we can write R(ρ) =
∑
k AˆkρAˆ
†
k, under the restriction∑
k Aˆ
†
kAˆk = Iˆ. We may think of this expansion as repre-
senting a k-outcome measurement, where it is allowed to
perform unitary operations conditioned on the outcome
of the measurement. The state-change corresponding to
outcome k is given by |ψ〉 7→ (〈ψ|Aˆ†kAˆk|ψ〉)
− 1
2 Aˆk|ψ〉.
Since player C only applies local operations, the most
general Aˆk = Iˆ ⊗ Iˆ ⊗
(
a b
c d
)
. But it is then simple to
show, by applying this Aˆk followed by the gate Jˆ
†, that
player C’s expected payoff is maximized only if Aˆk ∝ σˆx.
Therefore, the only strategy for player C which maxi-
mizes her expected payoff for every one of her measure-
ment outcomes is, up to global phase, σx. By repeating
similar arguments for players A and B, we verify that s is
indeed a Nash equilibrium for the full quantum strategy
space STCP .
We have seen that superior quantum coherent equilib-
ria occur in some games (the 3 player Dilemma and the
4 player Minority Game), but are absent in others (the
3 player Minority, and any maximally entangled fair 2
player game). But do quantum players always fare at
least as well as their classical counterparts? No. Figure
2 (c) is the payoff table for a game with a very high-
performing dominant strategy - since all other outcomes
have much lower total payoffs, this classically inevitable
outcome is optimal. But in the quantized game this pro-
file, now written as (Fˆ , Fˆ , Fˆ ), is no longer even a Nash
equilibrium: any player can unilaterally improve her pay-
off by switching to s = iσy, with severe consequences for
the other players. Therefore, any equilibria in the quan-
tum game will be inferior to the classical equilibrium.
To conclude, we have performed the first investiga-
tion of multi-player quantum games, finding that such
games can exhibit forms of ‘pure’ quantum equilibrium
which have no analogue in classical games, or even in
two-player quantum games. In the Minority Game, we
found that the players were able to exploit entangle-
ment to overcome the frustration in the classical variant,
and so play the game ‘perfectly’. More dramatically, in
our Dilemma game the quantum players can escape the
classical Dilemma entirely: they can play cooperatively
knowing that no player can successfully ‘defect’ against
the others. In this respect quantum entanglement fulfills
the role of a contract. Our observation of these purely co-
herent equilibria paves the way for an investigation into
iterated quantum games [26].
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